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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GROVER THOMPSON' 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN E. HARRIS Warden of the 
Utah State Penitentiary, 
Defendant. 
CARL RoLLAND DEMMICK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN E. HARRis, Warden of the 
Utah State Penitentiary, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
Case No. 6655 
Case No. 6656 
IN BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS' PETITIONS 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
STATEMENT OF THE C.A!SE 
The plaintiffs, Grover Thompson and Carl Rolland 
Demmick, have each petitioned the abo;ve court for a writ 
of habeas corpus, claiming they are illegally restrained 
of their liberty by the defendant, John E. Harris, warden 
of the Utah State Penitentiary. Attached to the petition 
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2 
of each plaintiff are the .certified copies of the informa-
tion, verdict, and con.unitment, which read as follows: 
(Title of Court and Cause): 
INFORMATION 
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTs, District Attorney of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, accuses GROVER THoMPSON of the Crime of RoBBERY 
AND BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL, as follows, to-wit: 
That the said Grover Thompson, on the 30th day of 
October, A. D. 1941, at the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, robbed ·Corniela Johnson, after the follow-
ing convictions: 
That the said Grover Thompson on the 23rd day of 
May, A. D. 1936, was convicted of the .crime of 
Burglary ,in the First Degree, in the County of 
Owyhee, Third Judicial District ,Court, State of 
Idaho, and on the 23 rd day of May, A. D. 1936, was 
sentenced to serve a term of not less than one or 
more than fifteen years in· the Idaho Btate Prison, 
and on said date was committed to ser-ve said term; 
That the said Grover Thompson on the 14th day of 
August, A. D. 1937, was convicted of the crime of 
Robbery in Salt Lake County, Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, State of Utah, and on the 17th day of 
August, A. D. 1937, was sentenced to serve a term 
of not less than five years to life, and on ·the 27th 
day of August, A. D. 1937, was committed to the 
State Prison to serve said term; 
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the .State of 
Utah, in such cases made and provided, and against the 
peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTs, 
District Attorney of the Third 
Judicial District in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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(Title of Cm~rrt and Cau.se): 
COM~fiTMENT 
January 29, 1942 
The above entitled case having been continued for 
further hearing until this date, the defendant, the Jury 
heretofore impaneled the respective counsel and all nec-
essary persons hereto being present and ready the fur-
ther trial of this case is resumed. Defendant '·s motion to 
strike State's exhibits D and F having ;been submitted 
and taken under advisement and the Court having con-
sidered and being now sufficiently advised in the premises 
denies said n10tion. Corniela Johnson is recalled and 
further examined. The state rests. Comes now defend-
ant's attorney and moves the court to dismiss this action. 
The motion is submitted ·without argument and denied. 
The defendant is sworn and testifies in his own behalf. 
Plaintiff's exhibits A, B, C, D, E, and F and defendant's 
exhibits one and two previously offered are by the Court 
recei;ved in evidence. Mrs. Charles 0 'Nash is sworn and 
testifies in behalf of the defendant. J. Ros-s Hunsaker 
is recalled and further examined. The defendant rests. 
J. Ross Hunsaker is recalled and testifies in rebuttal. 
State rests. Defendant rests. Both sides rest. Comes 
now defendant's attorney asks and is given leave to re-
open the case for the introduction of further te.stimony. 
Lyle Keller is sworn and testifies in behalf of defendant. 
On motion of Brigham E. Roberts, District Attorney the 
Liquor Control Commission is ordered to produce cer-
tain records. S. M. Grua and E. A. Johnson are sworn 
and testifiy in rebuttal. Edward Glen Cude and Corniela 
Johnson are recalled and further testify. State rests. 
Defendant rests. Both sides rest. Pursuant to oral 
stipulation of respective attorney in open Court the jury 
is instructed orally. The case is argued to the Court by 
respective attorneys and submitted. The jury thereupon 
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4 
retires to consider of its verdict and subsequently re-
turns into open Court and says by its foreman as follows, 
to-wit: 
"We, the Jurors, impaneled in the above case find 
the defendant guilty of rotberry and being an habitual 
criminal. '' 
Dated: January 29, 1942. 
Signed: N. HAMILTON, Forman. 
The jury is thereupon polled each juror answering in 
the affirmative the the above was and now is her or 
his verdict. The jury is discharged from further con-
sideration of this case and excused subject to call. Comes 
now the defendant, waives time for passing sentence 
and asks that sentence be passed at this time. The de-
fendant is thereupon asked by the Court if he has any 
legal ·cause to show why judgment and sentence should 
I not he pronounced upon him and the defendant having 
answered that he has not, the Court now pronounces 
the following judgment and sentence upon the defendant: 
"The judgment and sentence of this Court is that 
you, Grover Thompson, be confined and in1prisoned 
in the State Prison for a term of not less than 
fifteen years.'' 
And you, ·S. GRANT YouNG, Sheriff of Salt Lake Coun-
ty, Utah, are hereby commanded to take the said GROVER 
THoMPSON and deliver him without delay to the Warden 
of the State Prison, 'or other person in charge thereof, · 
then and there to be confined and imprisoned in accord-
ance with the above sentence and commitment. 
CLARENCE E. BAKER, Judge. 
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(Title of Court and Cause): 
VERDICT 
\V e, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find the 
defendant guilty of roberry and being an habitual crim-
inal as charged in the information. 
Dated Jan. 29, 1942. 
N. M. HAMILTON, Foreman. 
(Title of Court and Cause): 
INFORMATION 
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTs, District Attorney of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, accuses CARL RoLLAND DEMMICK alias RoBERT 
MAsoN alias RoBERT BRYSON of the Crime of Burglary in 
the Second Degree, Grand Larceny, and Being an Habit-
ual Criminal, and charges : 
That the said Carl Rolland Dernmick alias Robert 
.Mason alias Robert Bryson, on the 21st day of No-
vember, A. D. 1941, at the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, broke and entered the dwelling of Wayne 
Christofferson, in the nighttime, with intent to com-
mit larceny therein; 
That the said Carl Rol.land Demmick alias Robert 
:Mason alias Robert Bryson, on the 21st day of No-
vember, A. D. 1941, at the County of ·Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, stole fron1 Wayne Christofferson, one 
Philco Model 41608 Serial No. R-29350, and nine 
(9) Victor Records, all of the value of more than 
Fifty ($50.00) Dollars, the san1e being the property 
of Wayne Christofferson; 
That the said Carl Rolland Demmick alias Robert 
Mason, on the 2nd day of September, 1930, was con-
victed of the crime of Depriving an Owner of the 
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6 
Possession of His Automobile, in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and on the 2nd 
day of September, 1930, was sentenced to serve an 
indeterminate term not exceeding five years in the 
~state Prison of the State of Utah, and on the 5th 
day of ~September, 1930, was committed to the State 
Prison to serve said term; 
That the said Oarl Rolland Demmick alias Robert 
Bryson, on the 9th day of May, 1934, was convicted 
of the crime of Burglary in the .Second Degree, in 
the Superior Court of Sacramento County, State of 
California, and on the lOth day of May, 1934, was 
sentenced to serve a term of not less than one or 
more fifteen years in the Folsom Prison of the State 
of California, and on the lOth day of May, 1934, was 
committed to the Folsom Prison of the .State ·Of 
California to serve said term; 
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the ·State of 
Utah, in such cases made and provided, and against the 
peace and dignity of the .State of Utah. 
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTs, 
D·istrict Attorney of the Third 
Judicial District in and for 
SaU Lake Cownty, State of Utah. 
(Title of Court and Cause): 
VERDICT 
W·e; the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find the 
defendant Carl RoHand Demmick, guilty of the crime of 
Burglary in the Second Degree, and Being An Habitual 
Criminal as charged in the information. 
Dated Nov. 23, 1942. 
ALBERT BARTLETT, Foreman. 
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7 
(Tille of Court and Cause): 
VERDICT 
\Y e, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find 
the defendant Carl Rolland Demmick guilty of the crime 
of Grand Larceny, and Being An Habitual Criminal as 
charged in the information. 
Dated Nov. 23, 1942. 
ALBERT BARTLETT, F orem.an. 
(Title of Cou.rt and Cause): 
COMMITMENT 
November 28, 1942. 
This being the time previously fixed for the passing 
of sentence upon the within named defendant, said de-
fendant being present in person and represented by Ray 
S. McCarty, counsel, and Brigham E. Roberts, District 
Attorney, appearing in behalf of the State of Utah. The 
defendant herein having filed a motion for a new trial. 
Guy K. Robinson is sworn and examined in behalf of 
said motion and said motion is presented to the Court by 
counsel for the defendant and is denied. Thereupon 
the defendant is asked by the Oourt if he has any legal 
cause to show why judgrnent and sentence should not 
be pronounced upon him at this time. The defendant 
responds thereto that he has none, whereupon the Court 
pronounces the following judgment and sentence; 
"It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that 
you, Carl Rolland Demmick, be confined and im-
prisoned in the Utah State Prison for an indeter-
minate term of not less than fifteen ( 15) years nor · 
more than life upon the charge of burglary in the 
second degree and being a habitual criminal, and 
you are also sentenced by this Court to serve an 
indeterminate term of not less than fifteen (15) years 
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nor more than life in the Utah State Prison upon the 
charge of Grand Larceny and being an habitual 
criminal, said sentences to run concurrently. 
The Court orders the defendant granted a stay of 
execution of sentence to January 4, 1943 upon certain 
conditions imposed upon the defendant by the Court, 
and he is placed in the custody of the State Adult Parole 
and Probation Department. 
The within named defendant having previously 
been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this 
date, upon recommendation of the State Adult Parole 
and Probation Department and good cause appearing 
therefore the Court orders the defendant committed 
pursuant to the judgment and sentence previously en-
tered herein. 
And you, S. GRANT YOUNG, Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, are hereby commanded to take the said 
Carl Rolland Demmick and deliver him without delay 
to the Warden of the State Prison, or other person in 
eharg~ thereof then and there to be confined and im-
prisoned in accordance with the above sentence and 
commitment. 
Dated: Jan. 4, 1943. 
Issued : Jan. 5, 1943. 
(Title of Court and Cause): 
A. H. ELLETT, Judge. 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HAD IN CON-
NE-CTION WITH SENTE~NCING OF DEFENDANT, 
CARL ROLLAND DEMMICK, ON 
NOVEMBER 28, 1942. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE CoURT: Judgment and sentence of the court 
is that you he confined in the State Prison for the in-
determinate period as provided by law of not less than 
I, 
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9 
fifteen years. However, I am going to give you a stay 
in that matter and plare you with the Adult Board of 
Probation and Parole. 
l\lR. RoBERTS: There are two counts on this matter, 
Your Honor. I mn wondering· if the record should show 
the sentence on each. Of course, they can run concur-
rently. 
THE CouRT: Each one, I take it, to be an habitual 
criminal rharge. 
MR. RoBERTS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE CouRT: The burglary and grand larceny are 
each tied in with the habitual criminal. 
MR. RoBERTS: I guess the one sentence would be 
sufficient. 
THE CouRT: 'V ell, I am not just certain on that .. I 
had a little doubt at the time of instruction. I instructed 
the jury they could find either or rboth. I conceive that 
there are two separate offenses by virtue of the two 
counts, and the sentence on each count will be not less 
than fifteen years. They may run concurrently, and 
I am going to give you a stay until January 4, 1943. 
Now, where were you working, Mr. Demmick, when you 
were arrested? 
MR. DEMMICK: The first time I was arrested-that 
is, on this-they brought this charge against me-was in 
Tooele, Utah. I was driving a truck out there. 
THE CouRT: Where were you working when you 
came in to trial? 
MR. DEMMICK: I was working for Mr. Melis and 
Victor Newman. The day I came here I was supposed 
to have taken his truck to Hill Field and put it to work 
up there. 
THE CouRT: I will ask Mr. McFadden to make ar-
rangements to see if the same work can be had. If not, 
I will ask him to make some arrangements for your work, 
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and you will ~be left in jail until he calls for you. Are 
you a drinking man? 
MR. DEMMICK: Well, I drink a little, sir, but I am 
not a drinker. 
THE CouRT: I believe in each of your offenses there 
has been the matter of drink connected with it, some 
drink, some evidence of drink. One of the conditions 
of your staying out of the penitentiary is that you drink 
no liquor or beer. That may be hard, but it will be no 
harder than if you were in jail where you couldn't get it. 
MR. DEMMICK: No sir. 
THE CouRT: So you must not drink. If I hear of 
your drinking at all, I will sign a commitment, and you 
will sign the agreement with Mr. McFadden to report 
and be under his direction. 
MR. DEMMICK: Yes ~sir. 
THE CouRT: That's all. 
MR. DEMMICK: Your Honor, may I say somethingf 
THE CouRT: Yes. 
MR. DEMMICK : I think I can possi,bly clear this up 
in the next two or three months, this whole charge, and 
if it is possible for me to do it, would you exonerate mef 
THE CouRT: If you can do anything, I would do 
everything I could for you. I believe it lays in your 
power to clear this up. That is the reason I am not 
putting you in the pr~ison. I think you are implicated, 
but I think you had some help that are outside and that 
some of these boys that were doing some testifying are 
possibly in it just as much or more than you are, and I 
am satisfied it is in your power to clear this up. I will 
tell you this. I would think a lot more of you if you 
would come clean with the matter, because I think the 
:first element of being a good citizen is to tell the truth. 
MR. DEMMICK: ·That is right hut,· Your Honor I 
know it is pretty difficult for you to believe, and a nian 
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with IllY record that ean eome up here and on an ab-
.solute Ii1iscarriage of justice. 
THE CouRT: Yon can talk to the District Attorney 
about the thing. If you ran clear it up to the satisfac-
tion of hin1, I am ·Satisfied he would be interested in aid-
ing and assisting· you in getting a pardon on this Inat-
ter. too. 
MR. DEMMICK : Thank you, sn. 
That the plaintiff, Grover Thompson, .alleged that 
his restraint and imprisonment were illegal in this: 
a. That it affirmatively appears from said infor-
mation that the defendant had never been twice sen-
tenced and committed to prison for terms of not less 
than three years, as contemplated by Section 103-1-18, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
b. That said information was insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction upon the court for the reason that Section 
103-1-18, Revised ,Statutes of Utah, 1933, had been re-
pealed 1by implication by the indeterminate sentence 
act of 1919. 
c. That the verdict in the above case was improper 
and illegal, in that said verdict was based on an infor-
mation that did not confer jurisdiction on the court. 
d. That the court had no jurisdiction to try the 
status of an habitual criminal until the defendant had 
been convicted on the third substantive offense, to-wit, 
the robbery charge alleged to have been committed on 
the 30th day of October, 1941, said conviction being a 
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12 
condition precedent to the deter.mination of the defend-
ant's status as an habitual criminal. 
e. ·That sentence and commitment are void becaus~ 
they exceed the jurisdiction of the court, and because 
it cannot be determined from the record whether the 
defendant was sentenced for the crime of robbery or 
for the status of an habitual criminal, or both, and for 
the further reason that the sentence is an indefinite 
sentence. 
That the .said Carl Rolland Demmick, in addition 
to the foregoing reasons alleged, the sentence and com-
mitinent in his case were void for the reason that he 
was sentenced to fifteen years to life, and that the court 
had no jurisdiction to sentence the defendant on the 
first count for more than twenty years, and on the sec-
ond count for more than fifteen years, and that the .said 
sentence and judgment as appears from the transcript 
of the proceedings prepared by the official court reporter, 
·on November 28, · 1942, was illegal and void and beyond 
the jurisdiction of the court for the reason that the court 
had no power to sentence said defendant for being an 
habitual criminal, there being no such crime as habitual 
criminal, and for the further reason that said sentence 
is void because it is an indefinite sentence; and that 
said commitment made and entered January 4, 1943, 
was illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the court for 
the reason that the court had paroled thi~ defendant 
on November 28, 1942, and then on January 4, 1943, 
revoked said parole without hearing or without order 
to show cause. 
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That the defendant, John E. Harris, warden in 
each case, made his return adn1itting that he had cus-
tody of the defendants, and in each case attached a 
certified copy of the judgment and cmn1nitment, whieh 
judgn1ent and commitinent were the same as heretofore 
set out, and in addition thereto, the warden filed in each 
case his motion to quash the writ of habeas corpus, which 
were the same in each case, which claim that the pet,i-
tioner in each case did not set forth facts sufficient to 
justify the issuance of said writ and that each petition 
showed that the detention of the plaintiff by the de-
fendant is legal and lawful. 
POINTS FOR DETERMIN,ATION 
We will consider the points for determination as 
the plaintiffs have listed them in their petitions. 
PorNT I. 
THE COURT WAS WITHOUT JURI,SDIOTION TO PROCE,ED IN 
EITHER OF S'AID CASES BECAUSE IT AFIFIRMATIVE·LY 
APPEARS FROM THE INFORM·ATION IN EACH CASE THAT 
THE DEFENDANTS HAD NEVER BEEN TWICE SENTENCED 
AND COMM:ITTIDD TO PRISON FOR T'EiR.MS OF NOT LESS 
THAN THREE YEARS, AS CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 
103-1-18, RENISEID STATUTES OF UTAH, 1933. 
In considering this point, we will refer to the brief 
in the case of State of Utah v. Walsh. Following up the 
idea there suggested, we find that our habitual criminal 
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statute was taken practically verbatim from an old 
Massachusetts statute. See Commonwealth v. Richard-
son, (Mass. 1900) 175 Mag,s, 202, 55 N. E. 988. Prior to 
the enactment of this act, in the case of Ex parte Wil-
liam Seymour, (Mass. 1833), 14 Pick 40: 
"In the statutes of 1817 and 1827, which pro-
vide that whenever any person who shall be con-
victed of any crime, the punishement whereof 
shall be confinement to hard labor 'for any term 
of years' shall have been before sentenced to a 
like punishment, he shall be sentenced to punish-
ment in addition to that by law prescribed for 
the offense of which he shall be convicted, the 
words term of years mean a period of time not 
less than two years.'' 
The court said on page 43 : 
"We think the only mode of giving a rea-
sonaible and sensible construction to the statute is, 
to consider those words as introduced for the 
purpose of describing the higher classes of of-
fenses, distinguishing from among crir~:tes, all of 
which are by law punishable by confinement to 
hard labor, for longer or shorter periods, accord-
ing to their aggravation, those of sufficient mag-
nitude, to be punishable by a long period of con-
finement to hard labor. Considering this to be 
the object and purposes for which this clause was 
introduced into the statute, we think the natural 
and legal, as well as the literal and grammatical 
construction of the words, 'any term of years', 
must ibe a period of time of· not less than two 
years.'' 
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In the case of Co·rn.m-onwealth v. Ebenezer Evans, 
16 Pick (:Mass. 1835) 448, on page 451, in discus,sing Ex 
parte Seymour, supra, the court said: 
"In that rase it was held that the language 
of the statute was not to be understood in a 
technical sense, but as indicating the degree of 
aggravation, short of which a convict, after the 
second or third conviction, should not be sub-
jected to an additional punishment, and that any 
tern1 short of two years would not be sufficient 
for that purpose, although an estate for a half 
a year, or less, would he a term for years in the 
technical meaning of the words.'' 
It is obvious that the informations in both cases 
were so fundamentally defective in substance so that in 
no manner or form, and by no intendment or inference 
could it state a status denounced by our habitual crim-
inal law. Therefore, the informations were insufficient 
to confer jurisdiction, and the parties in custody by 
reason of commitments based thereon, should be dis-
charged on habeas corpus. Ex parte Thornto.n (Okla. 
1925), 234 P. 217. 
The cases at bar come within the rule laid down 
in Atwood v. Cox, 88 U. 424, 55 P. (2d) 377, at page 381, 
where this court says : 
"Where the pleading shows on its face that 
the subject-matter in regard to which ju~isdic­
tion is attempted to be invoked is one over which 
the court has no jurisdiction, then the court has 
no jurisdiction to go any further than to decide 
to refuse to take cognizance.'' 
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In the instant case, of course, the jurisdictional 
facts and essential ingredient missing is the fact that 
they had not ~been each previously convicted, sentenced, 
and committed to prison for terms of not less than 
three years. 
The following is taken from the note in 57 A. L. R. 
at page 86: 
''The rationale of this doctrine is that in 
criminal cases the jurisdiction of the court ex-
tends to such matters as the law has declared 
criminal, and none other; and when a court un-
dertakes to punish for an offense to which no 
criminality attaches, however reprehensible such 
offense may he in the forum of conscience, the 
court acts beyond its jurisdiction. An indictment, 
information, or written accusation is the very 
groundwork of the whole superstructure of a 
prosecution for the commission of an offense. If 
such an information contains allegations of overt 
acts or conduct which does not constitute any 
crime known to the law, or undertakes to state 
an offense, hut the facts stated do not constitute 
the offense, and no addition to them, however full 
and -complete, can supply what is essential, the 
court is ·without jurisdiction to put the accused 
on trial. In such case the judgment of convic-
tion cannot be corrected. It is ,simply void. Im-
prisonment thereunder is illegal, and the accused 
is entitled to his release in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, even though he might secure the same 
relief on appeal. ' ' 
That, we believe ·correctly states the rule. The above· 
remarks by the annotator are followed iby several well-
considered cases found in the same annotation. See 
also 39 L. R. A. 450-455. 
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Ex parte [(aster, (Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 
California, 1921), 198 P. 1029; 
Ex parte Robinson (Fla. 1917), 
75 So. 604, L. R. 1\. 1918B 1148; 
In re Evat1s, 42 U. 282, 130 P. 217; 
Batley v. Ritchie, 73 U. 320, 273 P. 969; 
Bruce v. East, Sheriff, 
43 U. 327, 331, 134 P. 1175. 
It might be argued that the court had jurisdiction 
over the substantive offense, even if it did not have juris-
diction over the status; that the allegations charging 
the substantive offense were mere surplusage. But, in 
the cases at bar, the substantive offenses were so co-
mingled with the status that it would be impossible to 
segregate them. They are charged together in the same 
information, tried at the same time at the trial, the ver-
dicts found the1n guilty of both, and they were sentenced 
and committed on both. It is not like charging two 
crimes in the same information under different counts. 
There it would be a very easy matter to segregate, be-
cause the verdicts would be separate, as also would be 
the sentence and commitment, but here they are so co-
mingled that they cannot be separated without destroy-
ing the entire structure. 
The plaintiffs contend that the entire charge and 
proceedings were void, and that the plaintiffs are en-
titled to their discharge. 
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PoiNT II. 
THAT SAID INFORMATION WAS INSUF'IFLOIENT TO CONFER 
JURISDICTION ON THE COURT FOR THE "RIDASON THAT 
SECTION 103-1-18, REVISED ·STATUTES OF UTAH, 1933, HAD 
BEEN REIPEA,LEID BY IMPLICATION BY THE INDET·ER-
MINATE SENTENCE ACT OF 1919. 
Section 103-1-18 provides specifically that in order 
that a previous crime might he made part of the predicate 
for a charge that a defendant was an habitual criminal, 
such crime must have resulted in conviction and commit-
ment for not less than three years. When Section 103-
1-18 was adopted, the legislature could only have con-
templated, and in fact did contemplate, that every sen-
tence should be set hy a judge, according to the degree 
of heinousness of the crime proved. In making a de-
cision as to sentence, the judge was limited to facts 
presented at the trial. 
With the passage of the indeterminate sentence act, 
judge-made sentences were eliminated. The Pardon 
Board was given the sole power to determine the length 
of sentence, where previously the trial judge had done 
so. It was held in ·several cases on matters distinguisha-
ble from those involved here that any sentence was for 
the maximum period permissible under the law, suibject 
to a ·condition subsequent, namely, the exercise of exe-
cutive clemency in the light of a multitude of personal 
and social factors which never were and never could 
have been considered by a judge in fixing a definite 
sentence ; as, for e~ample, facts occurring subsequent to 
.j 
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the trial. See the cases of IJ;J~dart v .. Pratt, 51 U. 246, 170 
P. 67; Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 U. 245, 284 P. 323, 76 A. L. R. 
460; and State v. Roberts, 91 U. 117, 63 P. (2d) 584. 
Can these two acts be reconciled in the light of all 
the facts and circumstances ·r Clearly not. Obviously 
it was not in1agined that practically every crime would 
furnish a basis for the application of the habitual crim-
inal statute. Such would, however, be the practical re-
sult if the maximum permissible sentence under the 
indeterminate sentenee law were held to be the sentence 
for the purpose of proving a defendant had acquired the 
·Status of being an habitual criminal. The framers of 
the indeterminate sentence act did not intend to create 
a rigid and inflexible system under which any two previ-
ous crimes with a maximum permissible sentence in ex-
cess of three years should form the predicate for a charge 
of being an habitual criminal at the instant of the third 
conviction. The fact that such an intention was lacking 
is proven by the fact that the legislature itself distin-
guished between (a) previous crimes requiring sentences 
of not less than three years each to meet the terms of the 
statute, and (b) a third crime, any felony, without re-
gard to the liability for sentence, be it long or be it short. 
Moreover, if the legislature had intended to provide that 
the maximum should govern, it could readily have so 
guished between (a) previous crimes requiring sentences 
provided, but it did not. Neither did it intend that the 
minimum sentence should govern, for the purpose of 
the habitual criminal act, for it did not so pro;vide. 
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Instead, the legis,Iature provided that, where the cir-
cumstances surrounding a crime were such as to lea~ 
a judge to fix a sentence of not less than three years, the 
crime should be used in. applying the habitual criminal 
statute. Since judge-made sentences have been abolished, 
and the actual duration of sentences is determined by the 
Board of Pardons, the only close approach to the orig-
inal intent of the legislature today is by counting those 
crimes where not less than three years have actually been 
served. 
Aside from the obvious fact that the legislature did 
not provide for the ''time actually served'' tes.t, there 
is a further and dominating reason why that test can-
not be used to reconcile the two statutes. That reason 
is that the indeterminate sentence act outlined a social 
policy with respect to the duration of sentences which 
was a complete substitute for the habitual criminal law 
and the social policy it represented. The whole purpose 
of the indeterminate sentence law was to provide a dif-
ferent standard of judgment with regard to sentence 
than that of the opinion of the legislature or of the in-
dividual trial judge, and one which would be sufficiently 
tailored to meet the need of society in each separate 
instance. See the case of Cardiseo v·. Davis, 64 P. (2d) 
216, cited on page 23 of the Walsh brief and quoted at 
length. All sentences became indeterminate, by the 
terms of the act. No sentence was definite within the 
permissible minimum and maximum limits, but all be-
came subject to the ·exercise of a .condition subsequent, the 
exercise by the Pardon Board, in its sole discretion, of 
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its judgent with regard to various stated and unstated 
facts, objectives, and principles of the administration of 
justice. 
If the legislature intended to g·ive this broad dis-
eretion respecting· the duration of sentence to the Board 
of Pardons, it impliedly withdrew its own previous de-
termination of the sentence in the type of case covered 
by the habitual criminal law. Such an implication is 
supported by the fact that the legis·lature gave such 
broad discretion to the Board of Pardons as to render 
inoperat-ive every legislativ·e determination of a ''min-
imu·m" sentence. The habitual criminal law is a minimum 
sentence la-w and is accordingly impliedly repealed. 
"\Vhen one realizes that penal statutes must be 
strictly construed, one must accept the view that two 
competing policies are expressed by these acts, the later 
of which crystallizes a modern, flexible concept which 
is inconsistent with the earlier, and which, being superior 
to the earlier, must govern. 
In this view, the district court had no jurisdiction 
to entertain an allegation of habitual criminality, since 
from the time of the passage of the indeterminate sen-
tence act, the babi tua.l criminal act was repealed by clear 
implication. Surely, if any act which is void by reason 
of being unconstitutiona·l can be attacked on habeas cor-
pus, an act which had been so clearly repealed by implica-
tion as Section 103-1-18 can be attacked in the same way. 
See the case of Ex Parte Bailey, 64 P. (2d) 278, (Okla., 
Grim. Ct. of .&ppeals, 1936), where the court, in an habeas 
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corpus proce-eding, held that a judgment of conviction 
for the "·crime'' of being an habitual crinrinal was void 
since there was no such offense known to the penal code. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE VERDICTS IN THE ABOVE CASES WERE IMPROPER 
AND ILLEGAL, IN THAT SAID VIDRDIOTS WERE BASED 
ON IN~ORM·ATIONS THAT DID NOT CONFER JURI-SDIC-
TION ON THE LOWIDR COURTS. 
The verdicts and commi.tments were improper, il-
legal, and beyond the jurisdiction of 'the lower oourts in 
that they were based on informations which gave no 
jurisdiction to the lower courts to determine whether or 
not the defendants had acquired the status of being 
habitual criminals. See arguments and citations under 
Points I, II, and III. 
V\1here a judgment, sentence, or order is fatally de-
fective upon the face of the record, habeas corpus will 
lie. 2.9 C. J. 8., p. 54, Sec. 46. 
PoiNT IV. 
THAT THE COURT HAD NO JURI·SDICTION TO TRY THE STATUS 
OF AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL UNTIL THE DEFENDANTS 
HAD BEEN CONVICTED ON THE THREE SUBSTANTIVE 
OFFENSES IN EACH CASE, SAID CONVICTIONS BEING 
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ANY DETERMINATION OF 
DEFENDANTS' STATUS AS HABITUAL CRIMINALS. 
The proposition that the court had no jurisdiction 
to try the status of being an habitual criminal in either 
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case until the defendant was convicted of his third 
substantive offense seems too clear to require discussion. 
The words of the act, ''upon conviction'', cannot pos-
sibly be construed to mean "before" or "during" or any 
other thing but "after" conviction. The third convic-
tion of any felony, follo,ving two previous convictions and 
conm1itments for not less than three years, is an absolute 
condition precedent to the determination of the de-
fendant's status as an habitual ·criminal, even if the stat-
ute be by son1e Ineans reconciled ·with the indeterminate 
sentence act, and is not a condition precedent that could 
be waived in any manner, being fundamental to the 
eause. See 29 C. J. 8., p. 44, Section 35, which reads as 
follows: ''Disregard of mandatory requirements es-
sential to jurisdi~tion to proceed with the trial will sup-
port habeas eorpus. '' 
Therefore, even if the court could reconcile the 
habitual criminal act with the indeterminate sentence 
act, no court could be said to have had jurisdi·ction of the 
status under the conditions which obtained in the trial 
courts in these cases. It is obvious that the courts not 
only pretended to have a jurisdiction clearly beyond 
their reach, but further than that, they permitted a 
mingling of two matters, on one of which they have 
had jurisdiction but on one of which they dearly did 
not to such a degree and extent as to render the entire 
proceedings below illegal, void, and beyond the juris-
diction of the courts. For one of the leading cases on 
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this point, see State V'. J(irkpatrick, 181 Wash. 313, 43 
P. (2d) 44, in which the defendant was charged identical-
ly as the defendant in the district court, Demmick, was 
charged. Kirkpatrick was convicted and sentenced to 
life imprisonment, but the higher court reversed the 
judgment and granted the man a new trial, stating that 
it refused to be bound by an archaic common-law prac-
tice, ''which impinges upon the fair and impartial trial 
guaranteed by the Constitution to everyone charged with 
a criminal offense.'' 
For further light upon .the proper construction of 
a statute such as ours, see the case of Beland v. U. 8., 128 
F. (2d) 795 (1942). This case supports the View that 
the fa·ct of previous convictions does not become material 
until after the trial on the substantive offense, and then 
it becomes material only for the purpose of determining 
a proper term of imprisonment. 
PoiNT V. 
TH~T THE COM.MlT'MENT OF CARL ROLLAND DEMMICK, MADE 
AND ENTERED JANUAR.Y 4, 1943, WAS I·LLIDGAL AND 
BEYOND THE JURI.SDI>GTION OF THE COURT. 
In the case of Carl Rolland Demmick, the court 
sentenced the defendant on November 28, 1942, as ap-
pears by the commitment. The court th~n ordered the 
defendant granted a stay of execution of sentence to 
January 4, 1943, upo~ certain conditions imposed upon 
the defendant by the court. These conditions do not 
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appear on the c01nmitment. Then on January 4, 1948, 
the commitn1ent states: 
'• The within ncuned defendant having previously 
been granted a stay of execution of sentenc-e to 
this date, upon recommendation of the State 
Adult Parole and Probation D1epartment and good 
cause appearing therefore the Court orders the 
defendant committed pursuant to the ,iudgment 
and sentence previously entered herein.'' 
The transcript of the proceeding·s of November 28, 
1942, which are set out in full in this brief, aid us in 
determining what the conditions were upon which he 
was granted the parole, suspended sentence, or "stay 
of execution'', as it is termed by the court. The court 
questioned the defendant as to his work and a~ to his 
drinking; in fact, the court said : 
"THE CouRT: I believe in each of your of-
fenses there has been the matter of drink con-
nected with it, some drink, some evidence of drink. 
One of the conditions of your staying out of the 
penitentiary is that you drink no liquor or beer. 
That may be hard, but it will be no harder than 
if you were in jail where you couldn't get it. 
''MR. DEMMICK: No sir. 
''THE CouRT : So you must not drink. If 
I hear of your drinking at all, I will sign a com-
mitment, and you will sign the agreement with 
Mr. McFadden to report and be under his direc-
tion.'' 
The court further went on to state that he believed that 
the defendant could clear the case up, and for that rea-
son he was not putting him in prison. The court even 
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went so far as to say that if the defendant could clear 
up the case to the satisfaction of the district attorney, 
he was satisfied that the district attorney would assist 
him, the defendant, in obtaining a pardon in the matter 
also. 
Now, what happened on January 4, 1943, cannot be 
determined as no notes were taken by the reporter on 
that date, and it can be safely assumed that the reason 
they were not taken was that nothing more occurred 
than what appears in the comn1itment in the files in the 
case; that is, that upon re·commendation of the State 
Adult Parole and Probation Departm·ent, and good cause 
appearing therefor, the court orders the defendant ·com-
mitted pursuant to the judgment and sentence previously 
entered herein. De.finitely, the defendant was not given 
an order to show cause why the suspension, or parole, 
or stay of execution should not terminate. He was 
merely taken into court, and for no reason apparent to 
the person reading the record, committed to prison. 
There was no citation or order to show cause served on 
the defendant in order for him to show the court that he 
had complied or was complying with the terms of his 
suspension. The record is silent as to the reasons why 
the court took an a'bout-face in this matter. Surely the 
language of the court at the time he sentenced this de-
fendant is such that the def·endant had reason to believe 
that he was being given an opportunity to stay out of 
prison for all time, if he complied with certain condi-
tions. In no sense could this be classed as a mere stay 
of execution, such as is given on certain occasions to 
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prisoners so they may clear up their affail;s, or receive 
medieal attention before going to prison. Regardless 
of the label,-stay, suspension, or parole-the actions of 
the court in this case came squarely under Section 105-
36-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 (Laws of Utah, 1933). 
The court had no jurisdiction to comnrit the defendant 
Demmick until there had been a hearing on the revoca-
tion of the suspended sentence. 
This case falls within the rule laid down in State v. 
Zolintakis, 70 U. 296; 259 P. 1044, 54 A. L. R. 1463. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs submit that the lower courts acted 
without and beyond their jurisdiction, to try or to hear 
the habitual criminal status-
First: Because the habitual criminal act was repealed 
by implication; 
Second: Because the pre;vious cnmes of which de-
fendants were convicted did not involve sentences 
of ''not less than three years'' as required by the 
statute; and 
Third: On account of the procedure followed by the 
lower courts. 
Therefore, all verdicts and commitments based upon 
such informations are nullities, void, and subject to at-
tack on habeas corpus. 
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The plaintiffs feel that merely to resentence these 
plaintiffs on their substantive offenses would not be ade-
quate or sufficient relief, since the co-mingling of that 
of which the lower courts ·Obviously had jurisdiction, and 
that of which they did not, was such as to render the 
whole proceedings void. 
Plaintiff Demmick's contention that his commitment 
on January 4, 1943, was beyond the jurisdiction of the 
court is of course purely academic unless the court finds 
that up until this point the lower court acted within its 
jurisdiction. 
The plaintiffs sUibmit that the writs of habeas corpus 
should be granted and that they should be discharged. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DoROTHEA MERRILL DRYER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff Grover 
Thompson 
Amicus Curiae, by app,oint-
ment of the Supreme Court. 
RAYS. McCARTY, 
Attorney for Plaintiff Carl 
Rolland Demmick. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
